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The Morning After the Revolution: From Kathmandu to Paris

Nepal’s Gen Z uprising is among the most successful youth movements of recent years. Within two days in September 2025, it brought down a government. It put the country’s first woman Prime Minister, Sushila Karki, in office on an interim basis. Six months later, a party that rode its momentum won by a landslide. If you stopped the story there, it would read like a blueprint for how a movement succeeds.

INEQUALITIESCIVIL SOCIETYSECURITYSOCIAL MEDIADEMOCRACYJOURNALISMPOLITICSTRENDEUROPEGEN-Z

Yosr Jlidi

11/16/20266 min read

Nepal’s Gen Z uprising is among the most successful youth movements of recent years. Within two days in September 2025, it brought down a government. It put the country’s first woman Prime Minister, Sushila Karki, in office on an interim basis. Six months later, a party that rode its momentum won by a landslide. If you stopped the story there, it would read like a blueprint for how a movement succeeds.

But the story did not stop there. A year on, the Nepal Gen Z Front asked why hundreds of protesters still faced cases or detention despite a promise to withdraw them. Families of the dead were offered compensation, but at the anniversary memorial, injured protesters said a promise of fully funded treatment had not been kept, and Prime Minister Balendra Shah, whose party won the March 2026 election by a landslide, did not attend. His government did move quickly on accountability, as former Prime Minister Oli was arrested within a day of the new cabinet’s first meeting. Still, that does not answer what the streets demanded.

That gap is the subject of this piece. Most commentary on the global Gen Z wave asks why they erupt or how they organize. The harder question concerns what these movements uphold beyond the protest. Here, it helps to separate three things that commentaries usually blur together: removal, representation, and restructuring. Removal means the target falls. Representation means members of the movement get into rooms where decisions are made. Restructuring means the system that produced the grievance changes. Gen Z mobilizations seem particularly good at the first, uneven at the second, and mostly stuck at the third. Movements that fail early rarely become case studies, so the pattern may be somewhat overstated, but the question of why it holds is still the right one.

Continuing with Nepal, the movement was leaderless from the very start. This is true of many recent Gen Z movements, Kenya’s 2024 protests among them, though not all, as Bangladesh’s 2024 student movement had identifiable coordinators. One Nepali organizer describes 'leaderlessness' as what is most beautiful about his generation, a contrast with an older generation in which everyone simply wanted a government post. Then, in the same breath, he names the cost. The movement could not present a united front, allowing those who were not part of Gen Z to hijack it. Both halves of that statement are true. ‘Leaderlessness’ protects the Gen Z movement from the oldest tricks in the repression handbook. There is no one to frame as a national threat, arrest, or flatter into compromise. But the same absence means no one can sit across a table and negotiate, and no one can sequence demands or play a long game. In Twitter and Tear Gas, Zeynep Tufekci argues that networked movements grow fast without building the organizational capacity to change tactics or make collective decisions afterwards, a failure she calls “tactical freeze.”

Bangladesh complicates the story, and that is why it matters. Its 2024 uprising had identifiable coordinators, and many of them joined the interim government. They helped produce a reform charter that roughly 68.6% of voters backed in a referendum. Yet their party won six out of 299 seats, while the BNP, a centre-right party, took a two-thirds majority, leaving implementation in limbo. What Bangladesh’s movement lacked was not leadership but a way to make that leadership a lasting part of the governing apparatus. Their coordinators initially advised the interim government, but later resigned to contest an election against a party that had spent decades building the machinery to win one.

That matters most at precisely the moment a movement wins removal. A movement that wins the street without winning a seat at the table often, whether willingly or not, hands over the aftermath to whoever has a structure, whether old political networks, established parties, or in some cases the military. Nepal’s organizers say their movement was hijacked by political ambition. Madagascar may show a more extreme version. Protests that began over water and power shortages ended with a military unit taking power; a clear case of a movement winning the street while a pre-set structure owned the aftermath.

Here the other defining trait of these movements becomes important. They are often rooted in grievance rather than ideology. Grievance is a powerful tool for tearing something down because everyone angry about the same thing can agree on the target. But it rarely translates into a program. Once the target falls, the movement discovers that it never agreed on an alternative.

Nepal shows one possibility for what happens next. As some leaders move into government while others stay in activist groups, the movement develops an inside and an outside. Insiders are accused of selling out and outsiders are dismissed as unrealistic. It is tempting to treat this as a failure, a sign of betrayal or fatigue. I am not convinced it should be read that way. There is a case that a healthy movement needs both, people inside the system who can write budgets and pass laws, and people outside it who keep the pressure on. No policy package will ever satisfy everyone, so opposition is guaranteed, and some of it is useful. The real question is whether the divide is a division of labor or a rupture. It stays a division of labor only if each side still recognizes the other as part of the same project. In Nepal’s case, however, the split looks closer to a rupture. Insiders and outsiders now dispute who speaks for the movement, and neither side treats the other’s work as part of a shared project.

Looping back to restructuring, when change does come, it often comes in a form that settles individual claims but not collective ones. Compensation for the injured and the families of the dead is right and necessary. But it answers people one at a time, while the movement’s demand was about the system. Resignations and symbolic firsts do something similar. They are real victories, and they can also quietly stand in for the structural reform that was the point.

This raises an uncomfortable thought. If a movement has no recognized channel into the political system, the system can respond to it only with gestures at the edges. Which leads to a question worth testing: what happens when youth have an access point from the start?

That is why the protests in France, Italy and Portugal matter. France is the clearest test. A high school protest that began in Créteil on September 18th over teacher staffing and conditions led to hundreds of blocked schools within weeks. Student organizations were received at Matignon, and the government produced a plan. It reportedly replaces Parcoursup in 2028, commits €5 billion to school buildings and indexes scholarships to inflation. This is the concrete and negotiable concession that access makes possible. But the movement no longer concerns admissions alone. Workers demanding relief from rising living costs have joined it, and its more radical demands, such as abolishing Parcoursup outright, leave the government facing far more than a single dispute. Student representatives welcomed some advances but called for continued mobilizations set to take place on October 31st, followed by a nationwide strike on November 5th. France differs from Nepal in wealth, party system and institutional history, so any lesson about access has to be held loosely. Italy and Portugal are weaker comparisons still. No Meloni Day is a recurring student mobilization rather than a single wave with a defined set of demands, while the Lisbon housing march was union-led and multigenerational, making it difficult to classify it as a Gen Z movement at all. The protest camps that followed were cleared by police. These cases serve as a testament that young people pressing on systems with formal channels is not unique to France.

My tentative reading is that access changes how movements fail, not whether they do. Without it, a movement collapses into a vacuum and someone else fills it. With it, the movement is hollowed out from within: radical demands are filtered out, the rest are translated into negotiable pieces, those pieces get addressed and the larger grievance remains. Another risk worth pinpointing is that the anger that formal channels fail to absorb flows to the extremes. For instance, polls show extreme candidates Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon leading in the 2027 French presidential race, a testament to the growing polarization of the French as President Macron's mandate comes to an end.

It may be too early to say. Nepal is a year out, Bangladesh is eight months from its election, and France is still mid-wave. Three things would change my view: a structural reform in Nepal, a French concession that outlasts the street pressure, or evidence that insiders and outsiders can keep working as one movement.

Until then, the evidence points to a narrower role than these movements are usually tasked with. Gen Z movements are better understood as agenda-setters and spoilers than as governing forces. They change what is thinkable and punish governments that ignore them, but they rarely write the replacement. That work falls to whoever is willing to take over the dull institutional labour afterwards, whether that be insiders, unions or parties. Furthermore, movements face a trade-off they rarely weigh openly. Access secures concrete concessions at the expense of radicalism, while refusing it preserves radicalism and leaves the aftermath in someone else’s hands. Either way, the morning after the revolution belongs to whoever arrives with a structure.


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