Small States and the Illusion of Strategic Autonomy

Sovereignty is a central principle of international relations, but being recognized as an independent state does not necessarily mean being able to act independently. While the United Nations Charter establishes the sovereign equality of its members, this legal recognition does not remove the inequalities in power that shape their relations (United Nations, 1945, Article 2). A state can possess its own government, borders and institutions while remaining heavily dependent on decisions taken elsewhere. This is particularly evident among small states, whose security choices are often influenced by regional conflicts and great-power competition. Thus, one could argue that their strategic autonomy is limited by the conditions under which they exercise it. It is essential to distinguish between possessing sovereignty and having the means to translate it into independent policy.

In this discussion, strategic autonomy refers to a state’s ability to establish and pursue its security priorities without external actors determining its choices. Sovereignty, by comparison, concerns the state’s legal independence and authority. The two are related, but they are not interchangeable. A government may legally choose its alliances, yet find that certain choices expose it to military retaliation or the withdrawal of essential assistance. Furthermore, smallness should not be understood only in terms of territory or population. Drawing on relational approaches within small-state literature, this study defines smallness through the imbalance between a state’s capabilities and those of the external powers influencing its security. These capabilities include not only military strength but also economic resources, administrative capacity and diplomatic influence (Long, 2017; Thorhallsson, 2006). The question is therefore how much freedom remains when exercising a sovereign right may exceed the state’s military capacity, destabilize its economy through the loss of trade or financial assistance, or expose it to diplomatic isolation.

Realism provides a useful explanation for this gap. More specifically, Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism emphasizes the absence of a central authority capable of guaranteeing every state’s security. Within this international system, states must consider their survival, while differences in capabilities shape their opportunities and vulnerabilities (Waltz, 2000). For small states, this creates a difficult situation: protecting their independence may require assistance from a stronger power. However, the relationship that provides protection can also limit their freedom. From this perspective, dependence is not necessarily the result of poor leadership or a lack of national ambition; it can emerge from the unequal distribution of power itself.

Lebanon illustrates this problem, although its vulnerability cannot be explained by its size alone. The country has also faced the division of military authority between the state and Hezbollah, whose financial and military support from Iran connects domestic security to regional competition. During the 2024 Israel-Hezbollah war, Prime Minister Najib Mikati appealed to Iran to help secure a ceasefire, while an American proposal was communicated to Hezbollah through Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri (Mroue & Rising, 2024). These developments illustrate how decisions affecting Lebanese territory involved actors beyond the government’s direct control. The implication is that Lebanon’s ability to protect its population depended partly on negotiations with powers and armed actors pursuing their own priorities.

The distinction between formal authority and effective control is also reflected in Security Council Resolution 1701. Adopted in 2006, the resolution called for the extension of Lebanese government control throughout the country and the disarmament of armed groups (United Nations Security Council, 2006). These provisions establish a clear objective, but declaring state authority does not automatically create the capacity to enforce it. Nevertheless, one should not treat Lebanon’s experience as the inevitable condition of every small state. Domestic institutions and political divisions matter. Regional competition becomes particularly restrictive when internal actors disagree over national security priorities, allowing external powers to influence the country through competing local relationships.

Jordan presents a different form of constraint. Its relationship with the United States illustrates how external assistance can strengthen a state while making the preservation of that relationship a major policy consideration. In September 2022, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding supporting the provision of $1.45 billion annually in American assistance for fiscal years 2023–2029, subject to congressional appropriations (U.S. Department of State, 2022). This does not establish that Washington dictates Jordanian policy. This can create an incentive for Jordan to take the value of the partnership into account when making policy decisions. At the same time, Jordan’s strategic importance gives it bargaining power. Dependence can be unequal without being entirely one-sided.

Georgia demonstrates another limitation: seeking support from stronger states does not necessarily secure their protection. At the April 2008 Bucharest summit, NATO declared that Georgia would eventually become a member, but this political commitment did not constitute immediate membership or a collective-defence guarantee (North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 2008a). Following the August war with Russia, NATO reaffirmed its support for Georgia’s sovereignty and condemned Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (NATO, 2008b). The case illustrates the difference between diplomatic support and guaranteed military assistance. Georgia could pursue a Western orientation, but it could not independently determine either Russia’s response or the extent of Western protection. Recognizing this constraint does not justify Russian intervention; it explains the unequal conditions surrounding Georgian decision-making.

Despite these limitations, describing small states as entirely powerless would overlook the choices they still possess. Governments can diversify partnerships, strengthen domestic institutions and negotiate forms of cooperation that increase their room for manoeuvre. For example, through the 2016 Jordan Compact, Jordan negotiated financial assistance, concessional loans and preferential access to European markets in exchange for granting Syrian refugees greater access to employment. This allowed Jordan to transform the pressures created by the refugee crisis into economic and diplomatic opportunities, illustrating how a small state can use negotiation to increase its autonomy, even if only temporarily (Barbelet et al., 2018; Lenner & Turner, 2019). External support may even expand autonomy when it reduces vulnerability to a threatening neighbour. The issue is therefore not whether alliances always undermine independence, but whether the protection they provide outweighs the dependence they create. Lebanon, Jordan and Georgia reveal different mechanisms of constraint: fragmented authority, reliance on assistance, and exposure to a stronger neighbour without guaranteed protection.

Ultimately, the illusion lies in assuming that formal sovereignty produces equal freedom of action. Small states make decisions, but they do so within circumstances they often have limited power to change. Realism helps explain why legal equality coexists with unequal security choices, although domestic politics remains necessary to understand how individual states respond. Strategic autonomy is therefore a matter of degree. A state may retain the right to decide its future while lacking the resources to pursue every available option. Recognizing that distinction allows sovereignty to be assessed through what governments can actually accomplish, beyond what they are formally entitled to do.

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