Governance Systems: Patronage, Power, and Institutional Weakness in the MENA Region

Executive Summary

In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, anti-corruption efforts and governance reforms have often proved unsuccessful in addressing nepotism and clientelism in government and economic institutions. Public distrust, high levels of youth unemployment, and economic inequality have all become central to debates on governance and accountability across the region. The Arab Barometer (2024) found a sharp decline in citizens’ confidence in political institutions across several MENA countries, particularly among young people, who are more likely to experience economic insecurity and political marginalization. Nepotism is often viewed as a cultural problem or a form of personal corruption rather than as a product of the structural and political conditions in which patronage networks flourish.

Access to elite networks remains deeply embedded in government institutions, where employment, economic opportunity, and political power are often closely interconnected across many Arab governance systems. These informal networks frequently undermine merit-based recruitment, weaken institutional accountability, and reduce the effectiveness of public-sector governance. These governance gaps significantly constrain progress toward several Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including SDG 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions), SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities). Several MENA countries ranked among the lowest performers in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, reflecting persistent concerns regarding transparency and accountability in public-sector institutions. Iraq received a CPI score of 26/100, ranking 140th globally, while Lebanon scored 22/100 and ranked 154th. Tunisia has also experienced a decline in governance indicators since the immediate post-Arab Spring period (Transparency International, 2024).

Clientelist systems are not always the result of government failure; rather, they often function as informal mechanisms that compensate for institutional weaknesses. This article argues that nepotism persists across governance systems in the Middle East and North Africa not because of a lack of anti-corruption policies, but because of its political utility, historical embeddedness, and institutionalization. Drawing on the experiences of Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia and the Gulf monarchies, this article examines how clientelism and weak institutional accountability hinder long-term political and economic development.

Issue Synopsis

Nepotism and informal networks in the MENA region highlight deeper-rooted issues associated with weak accountability, authoritarianism, and elite-driven political systems. Across both republics and monarchies, political loyalty often goes hand-in-hand with access to economic opportunities, state resources, and political power. This issue synopsis summarizes the key dimensions of the problem, each led by a theme statement followed by sub-statements and evidence.

To grasp the extent of nepotism, governance must be examined from a political economy perspective rather than solely through the lens of individual misconduct. Many MENA countries are characterized by weak institutions and authoritarian governance, which have fostered clientelist arrangements in which informal networks of the elite control access to political and economic opportunities.

Problem Analysis Framework

A. Patronage systems remain structurally embedded within governance systems across the MENA region.

1. Weak institutional foundations have allowed elite-centered governance systems to consolidate.

• Colonial arrangements prioritized political control over institutional development.

• Several post-colonial states inherited fragmented administrative systems.

• Centralized authority weakened institutional independence and accountability.

• Khashan (2025) argues that many Arab states evolved into neopatriarchal governance systems.

2. Political loyalty often outweighs meritocratic qualifications.

• Public-sector employment is often tied to elite or sectarian networks.

• Patronage systems function as mechanisms of political survival.

• Clientelist structures reinforce elite influence over governance institutions.

• Informal networks frequently shape access to state resources.

B. Anti-corruption reforms frequently fail because political systems rely on patronage networks.

1. Reforms are often selective or symbolic rather than structural.

• Governments frequently target individual misconduct rather than the institutional incentives that sustain corruption.

• Oversight institutions often remain politically constrained.

• Anti-corruption campaigns frequently coexist with centralized executive authority.

• Reform efforts rarely challenge elite political networks directly.

2. Sectarian and authoritarian systems complicate institutional reform.

• Lebanon and Iraq continue to experience sectarian patronage politics.

• Tunisia´s democratic transition has struggled because of institutional fragmentation.

• Egypt´s centralized governance structure limits institutional transparency.

• Political elites frequently rely on patronage systems for regime stability.

C. Patronage systems undermine sustainable development and institutional legitimacy.

1. Nepotism weakens economic mobility and limits meritocratic opportunities.

• Youth unemployment remains high across several MENA states.

• According to the World Bank (2024), the MENA region continues to have some of the highest youth unemployment rates globally, particularly among university graduates.

• Economic advancement is frequently perceived as dependent on personal connections.

• According to Arab Barometer (2024) surveys, many respondents across the region believe that political and personal connections are more important than qualifications in obtaining employment opportunities.

• Patronage systems weaken labor market efficiency.

• Informal economies expand when trust in state institutions declines.

2. Governance failures hinder progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

• Weak institutional accountability undermines SDG 16.

• Transparency International (2024) notes ongoing concerns about institutional corruption, inadequate judicial independence, and insufficient public-sector transparency in several MENA countries.

• Unequal access to opportunity undermines SDG 10.

• Patronage-based labor systems hinder progress toward SDG 8.

• Corruption and clientelism reduce public trust in governance systems.

Overall, nepotism in the MENA region is not merely the result of administrative shortcomings but reflects deeper systemic incentives embedded within governance structures. Clientelist structures persist because they promote political survival, reinforce elite alliances, and compensate for deficits in institutional legitimacy. Thus, anti-corruption policies that ignore the political and institutional factors that give rise to corruption are not likely to change the status quo.

Addressing governance shortcomings across the region requires more than just superficial reform efforts. Achieving sustainable transformation requires greater institutional independence, reduced elite capture of state institutions, and expanded meritocratic access to economic and political opportunities. These larger macro-level factors are the basis for realistic and practical policy recommendations.

Insight and Analysis

Nepotism extends beyond individual acts of corruption and remains a widespread feature of governance across the MENA region. Clientelist structures persist because they serve political elites, are institutionally embedded within governance systems, and support broader systems of political survival. Across republics, monarchies, and hybrid regimes, these governance models erode accountability and reinforce the centralized power and influence of elites.

The next analysis examines the problem from three perspectives. First, it explores the historical development of state formation, authoritarian rule, and informal patronage networks. Second, it considers why anti-corruption efforts often fail to produce meaningful institutional change. Third, it analyzes the economic and developmental consequences of nepotism, with particular attention to the Sustainable Development Goals and institutional legitimacy.

Historical and Structural Roots of Patronage

Nepotism has been a significant feature of postcolonial governance structures in the MENA region, and this phenomenon is deeply rooted in its history. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of colonial agreements such as the Sykes-Picot agreement, many Arab states emerged with fragile institutional foundations and highly centralized systems of governance. As Khashan (2025) notes, colonial powers typically prioritized political control and administrative stability over the development of representative institutions. Newly formed governments were left with weak administrative structures and weak mechanisms for accountability and institutional openness. Khashan argues that colonial territorial divisions helped shape regimes with elite control that facilitated elite-dominated governance, with an emphasis on political survival and not institutional development.

Khashan then proposes that many postcolonial Arab countries developed into “neopatriarchal” states, where political power was concentrated in elite networks and personal governance. In these forms of government, governing elites tended to view the state as a mechanism of political control as opposed to an independent institution operating for the public good. These postcolonial forms of governance formalised personal authority and hindered the development of state institutions.

The governance systems evolved differently in republics and monarchies, and many had similar patronage structures. In republics like Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, military-dominated systems of government have tended to reduce institutional pluralism and to increase the concentration of power. Gulf monarchies have frequently relied on patronage networks and distributive economic systems to uphold social and political stability, however. In both cases, clientelist networks became embedded within governance institutions.

Elite-centred governance systems have remained consolidated in history and continue to have an influence on political and economic institutions in the region. Since institutional accountability is often weak and power systems are centralised, transparency is often hindered, and informal networks of influence are reinforced. Based on the World Bank Governance Indicators (2024), the following MENA countries are still below average scores for Governance.

According to the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (2024), several MENA countries score below the global average on measures such as government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption. As a result, progress towards SDG 16, which emphasises transparent, effective, and accountable institutions, is difficult to attain under governance systems where political loyalty typically trumps meritocratic qualifications.

Authoritarianism And Institutional Weakness

Patronage and nepotism have persisted largely because of authoritarian governance across much of the Arab world. Khashan (2025) argued that a number of Arab governments curtailed civil society and concentrated political power within ruling elites. These systems often made state institutions a tool of the elites' political rule, diminished institutional autonomy and undermined accountability mechanisms. The region's authoritarianism tends to be based on informal political networks that keep the elites united and the regime stable, notes Carnegie Middle East Center (2024).

While colonial legacies weakened institutional development, authoritarian governance has reinforced these structural weaknesses. Egypt's centralized executive authority and military influence has long been used to bolster systems where elite alignment is intrinsically tied to economic and administrative access. State and military-backed governments have been successful at consolidating power and have diminished institutional transparency in many instances, and strengthened elite influence over economic and political outcomes. Similarly, Syria´s authoritarian political structure was mainly based on networks of loyalty and patronage, which centralized power around political elites and security organizations.

Clientelist structures can also be built into the structure of governing, as in the case of the Gulf monarchies. Although they are very different from republics like Egypt and Syria, many Gulf states rely on rentier-based distribution systems that are offered to the people in exchange for political support and social order. Ruling authorities regularly use public-sector jobs, governmental subsidies, and economic privileges to consolidate political legitimacy and maintain elite relations. For some Gulf monarchies, one of the main ways that they distribute economic gains and retain political legitimacy is through public-sector jobs.

These governance systems undermine institutional accountability by emphasizing regime preservation over institutional independence. Anti-corruption reforms are frequently selective or symbolic since they challenge structures that political elites rely on for stability and survival. As a result of this, attempts to promote transparent governance and institutional accountability in line with SDG 16 continue to confront fundamental political opposition across most of the area (OECD, 2024).

Why Anti-Corruption Reforms Often Fail

Although many countries across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have introduced anti-corruption reforms, these initiatives have often produced limited institutional change. In many cases, reforms are selectively implemented and target individual instances of corruption rather than the institutional incentives that sustain clientelist systems.

The MENA region, including countries like Tunisia, has a problem with corruption. Tunisia appeared poised to become a democratic success story following the Arab Spring. Tunisia made political reforms and more people got involved in politics after Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was removed from power in 2011 (Brookings Institution, 2024). But with these reforms Tunisia still encountered issues with its government, people experienced major institutional distrust and the economic performance remained weak.

Similarly, in countries like Egypt, anti-corruption rhetoric is usually combined with presidential authority and inadequate levels of institutional transparency. While the government talks about stopping corruption, there are few effective checks and balances. Institutions with a primary goal of increasing transparency and reducing corruption tend to have large political restrictions placed, making it more difficult to implement reforms such as legal reforms or accountability initiatives which have all been announced previously. Therefore, while the government may make some reforms and attempt to encourage accountability, the organizations that are assigned to watch over the government are often controlled by their own people.

Lebanon and Iraq are additional examples of countries where corruption is a significant problem specifically when looking at sectarian governing systems. In these countries, the government and access to public-sector resources are often controlled by certain groups of people. This means that the people in power use corruption to stay in power and reforms have little chance of succeeding because they threaten the interests of ruling elites.

As a result of this, the failure and discontinuity of various anti-corruption programs in the MENA region reveal deeper fundamental contradictions within the governance systems. It is evident from this that the problem is not that people are ignoring corruption, it is that the systems of government tasked with combatting these issues are set up to enable corruption and to a certain extent encourage it.

Economic Consequences of Patronage and Nepotism

The power that characterizes these nepotistic governance systems has serious social and economic ramifications with widespread effects on the youth. In the majority of industries, familial, political, or sectarian connections are prioritized over professional skills when it comes to employment, public-sector jobs, and contracts. This significantly reduces labor market efficiency while additionally limiting opportunities for people who simply do not have connections within the upper echelons of society.

These dynamics have led to an increase in the rates of unemployment among the youth in countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia, where economic well-being is also a factor being directly impacted by these behaviors. According to World Bank data (2024), youth unemployment in the MENA region remains among the highest globally, adding increased distrust in government institutions. This has led many to believe that social, economic, and personal growth is no longer determined by skill or talent but rather by personal connections and social hierarchy. Arab Barometer (2024) indicates that declining trust in institutions and concerns about corruption has had a substantial influence on the younger generations. This therefore undermines the general public´s trust in institutions and exacerbates widespread discontent in governance networks.

The MENA region, including countries like Lebanon, has experienced increasing public dissatisfaction and declining institutional trust. This is because people think that the only way to get ahead is to have connections, not because of their skills. The banking sector in Lebanon is an example of this, where political and financial elites work together to protect their interests.

Economic unhappiness is a growing narrative within the MENA region with countries like Lebanon observing a high level of economic dissatisfaction. Analysis of Lebanon´s banking sector shows that political and economic elites work together in a mutually beneficial system in order to protect personal interests, inevitably prioritizing elite survival over institutional viability. Furthermore, a growing informal economy is the direct result of the deterioration of the economic system hindering the government's ability to regulate activities thoroughly.

The expansion of black-market economies within the region is a clear demonstration of the consequences of limited accountability and eroding social confidence (Akiki & Jannoun et.al, 2024). While these systems may create short-term benefits, they fundamentally undermine regulatory supervision and institutional credibility. Moreover, progress towards the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals is being obstructed, including SDG 8, which promotes decent work and economic growth, and SDG 10, which aims to reduce inequalities.

Lebanon as a regional case study

Informal political networks remain a defining feature of governance across much of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Lebanon provides a useful case study of how patronage networks and sectarian governance can undermine institutional effectiveness. Lebanon's sectarian political system has produced a power-sharing arrangement in which political authority is distributed among religious communities. As a result, political authority and economic influence are often closely linked to powerful groups and individuals. This governance structure illustrates how clientelism and competing political factions can weaken state capacity, reduce accountability, and hinder effective governance.

Lebanon's financial crisis illustrated the consequences of close relationships between political and financial elites when effective accountability mechanisms are absent in ways that are detrimental to the widespread population (Chehabbedin, 2025). According to the World Bank, Lebanon’s financial crisis ranks among the world's most severe economic crises since the mid-nineteenth century. Chehabbedin additionally suggested that influential figures in politics and finance collaborate in ways that make it difficult to hold them accountable. The Lebanese financial crisis is one example of this. Elite actors tend to prioritize economic self-preservation over political accountability. Close relationships between financial institutions and political elites have reduced transparency and weakened regulatory oversight, making accountability more difficult to achieve.

Allegations of corruption, political interference, and weak oversight have long affected governance at Beirut Port and within the customs administration. These governance challenges reflect broader institutional weaknesses within the Lebanese state (Akiki & Farghal, 2025). Multiple political factions and influential actors have historically exercised considerable influence over appointments and administrative decision-making. The Beirut Port explosion killed more than 200 people, injured thousands, displaced hundreds of thousands of residents, and exposed longstanding failures in governance and regulatory oversight. The disaster triggered widespread public protests and intensified criticism of the government's accountability and effectiveness. The disaster illustrates how prolonged institutional weakness and inadequate oversight can produce catastrophic consequences.

The emergence of elite economic coalitions has contributed to declining public trust in government institutions and financial systems. This weakens political power and creates increased economic disparity and instability. Lebanon's governance and economic crises illustrate the long-term consequences of entrenched patronage networks. Similar challenges with governance exist throughout the region. The Lebanese example demonstrates how favor-based institutions may gradually undermine accountability, economic stability, and public trust.

Comparative Regional Perspectives

There is a general consensus that patronage systems differ across the MENA region, but often fulfil similar political functions. In Egypt, the concentration of executive power and the military influence has reinforced institutions in which political loyalty is closely connected to economic access and administrative authority. Gulf monarchies often employ rentier distribution schemes as a tool to ensure political stability, offering economic incentives in exchange for political allegiance and social compliance. Comparative corruption indicators illustrate the regional variation in governance performance. Gulf monarchies rank better than conflict-affected republics such as Iraq and Lebanon on institutional indicators, but governance concerns like transparency, accountability, and political centralization persist across political systems, according to Transparency International (2024).

Tunisia is a contrasting case where the Arab Spring initially brought about democratic reforms, enhancing political participation. The Brookings Institution (2024) argues that political liberalization initially occurred, but Tunisia´s democratic transition was hindered by economic instability and institutional fragmentation. However, institutional fragmentation and economic insecurity contributed to subsequent democratic backsliding. Sectarian patronage networks that shape political appointments and access to state resources continue to pose significant governance challenges in Iraq. There, sectarian political distribution mechanisms remain in place to determine public-sector appointments and governance structures (Carnegie Middle East Center, 2024).

These systems of governance, despite shifts in political form, show how patronage networks are able to adapt to different institutional environments, while at the same time undermining accountability and meritocratic government. In many cases, political elites frequently rely on these institutions not only for economic gain but also to maintain political continuity and regime stability.

This broader regional perspective shows that nepotism in the MENA region should not be seen as an isolated practice of corruption or culture, but rather as an expression of deeper institutional and political processes that affect governance in a number of political systems. It reflects broader institutional dynamics and shapes governance across diverse political systems throughout the region.

Sustainable development goals and governance reform

The persistence of patronage and nepotistic governance structures has direct implications for several Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions), SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities). Institutional corruption and unequal access to economic opportunity are significant barriers to long-term development in the Arab region, according to the United Nations Development Programme (2024).

Weak institutional accountability and corruption undermine public trust and reduce the effectiveness of governance systems (Transparency International, 2024; World Bank, 2024). SDG 16 emphasizes accountable institutions, reduced corruption, and inclusive governance as prerequisites for sustainable political development (United Nations, 2024). Institutions that reward political loyalty rather than professional competence are less likely to develop transparent, accountable, and effective systems of governance. As a result, there are limits to efforts to strengthen the rule of law, public accountability, and institutional legitimacy. Thus, governance failures in the region should not only be viewed as political failures but as developmental impediments that challenge the long-term social and economic viability of the region.

Furthermore, labor markets shaped by political or personal connections hinder meritocratic opportunity and limit social mobility. Unequal access to employment and public resources contributes to greater economic inequality and dissatisfaction among younger populations across the region. Young people across the region have become increasingly frustrated by inequalities driven by unequal access to employment and public resources.

Ad hoc anti-corruption measures alone cannot produce sustainable governance in the MENA region. Structural reforms are needed to increase institutional independence, openness and accountability, and equal access to opportunities. Meaningful reforms are unlikely to succeed without addressing the underlying political incentives that sustain patronage networks.

Policy Recommendations

1) Strengthening Independent Oversight Institutions

A key step toward reducing nepotism and patronage in the MENA region would be to strengthen institutional independence and oversight. To investigate corruption effectively, anti-corruption agencies, judicial institutions, and financial oversight bodies should operate independently of executive political control. International organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, and regional governance organizations can support these efforts through institutional training, transparency initiatives, and accountability reforms.

This policy would be primarily implemented at the national level while benefiting from regional cooperation mechanisms. Countries such as Tunisia have introduced institutional reforms aimed at increasing oversight and transparency following the Arab Spring, although implementation has proven challenging. The Tunisian experience illustrates that institutional independence and effective accountability mechanisms are essential for strengthening governance, although political resistance and implementation challenges have limited reform outcomes (Brookings Institution, 2024). Strengthening institutional independence would improve accountability and advance SDG 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions).

2) Expanding Merit-Based Public Sector Recruitment

Gradually reduce the influence of political connections in public-sector recruitment by establishing merit-based hiring systems across the region. Independent examinations, transparent selection procedures, broad hiring criteria, and digitized application processes can reduce politically motivated and clientelist appointments. Based on OECD governance research (2024), digitalization of recruitment processes could minimize administrative corruption and enhance institutional transparency.

Digital governance reforms implemented outside the MENA region demonstrate how transparent recruitment processes can reduce administrative corruption and improve institutional efficiency. While these reforms are likely to encounter resistance from entrenched political networks, they are expected to be implemented gradually, and by ministries like finance, education, and civil service administration, thereby strengthening long-term institutional legitimacy and contribution to SDGs 8 and 10.

This reform would require cooperation among ministries responsible for civil service, finance, and education, together with independent oversight institutions and international governance organizations. Implementing this reform would likely take place over a medium-term timeframe (5-10 years) due to expected opposition from ingrained political networks. Similar merit-based civil service systems implemented in Estonia and Singapore have contributed to greater transparency and lower levels of administrative corruption.

3) Supporting Local Economic Development and Private Sector Expansion

Patronage systems often depend on citizens’ reliance on the state and limited economic opportunities; therefore, governments should promote private-sector development and decentralised economic growth. Supporting entrepreneurship, local businesses, and independent economic sectors can reduce citizens' dependency on patronage networks for job and financial security.

This policy would necessitate a collaboration among governments, private-sector actors, development organizations, and educational institutions. Lebanon’s economic crisis highlighted the risks associated with dependence on elite-dominated political and financial systems, which undermine long-term economic resilience. Creating economic opportunities through decentralization can reduce the influence of clientelist networks and boost social mobility and economic participation.

Conclusion

As discussed in the issue synopsis, nepotism in the MENA region is not simply the result of individual corruption or cultural practices, but from the historically entrenched governance systems and political incentives. Clientelist systems continue to operate across a range of political systems, including republics, monarchies, and hybrid regimes. Such dynamics not only jeopardize institutional accountability but also contribute to economic inequality and loss of trust in institutions. Understanding why these systems persist requires examining the relationship between institutional weakness and patronage networks, a discussion explored in the Insight and Analysis section.

Final Conclusion

Nepotism remains a persistent challenge across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This reflects governance systems in which political decisions are frequently shaped by elite networks rather than transparent institutional processes. Political elites in countries such as Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia, and Iraq frequently use public-sector employment, state resources, and patronage networks to maintain political support and consolidate their influence.

The experiences of countries such as Lebanon and Tunisia illustrate the long-term consequences of entrenched patronage systems. Public trust in government declines, institutional legitimacy weakens, and economic performance suffers. Although many governments across the MENA region have introduced anti-corruption initiatives, these efforts often fail to address the institutional incentives that sustain patronage networks. As a result, long-term transformation requires greater institutional independence and transparency. Greater institutional independence, transparency, and equal access to opportunities are therefore essential for long-term reform. Without sustained structural reform, progress towards Sustainable Development Goals 16, 8, and 10 is likely to remain limited across much of the MENA region.

Moreover, without addressing the structural political incentives that allow patronage systems to persist, anti-corruption reforms implemented across the MENA region are more likely to remain symbolic rather than transformational.

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