Can the Lebanese Army Replace UNIFIL in South Lebanon?

With the approaching end of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon’s mandate, the question of whether the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) could replace UNIFIL in South Lebanon has become increasingly relevant. However, the question itself is misleading. It assumes that UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army have the same objective, when in reality they do not. The LAF is responsible for defending Lebanese territory, maintaining security and extending the authority of the Lebanese state. UNIFIL, on the other hand, was created as an international peacekeeping force with monitoring, liaison and de-escalation responsibilities. Therefore, the real question is not simply whether the Lebanese Army is capable of replacing UNIFIL, but which of UNIFIL’s responsibilities can actually be transferred to it.

To understand this distinction, it is necessary to know why UNIFIL is present in Lebanon in the first place. UNIFIL was initially established by the Security Council in 1978, while its role was considerably expanded following the 2006 war through Resolution 1701. Under this resolution, UNIFIL was tasked with monitoring the cessation of hostilities, accompanying and supporting the deployment of the Lebanese Army throughout the South, and assisting in establishing an area between the Litani River and the Blue Line free of unauthorized armed personnel and weapons. Thus, UNIFIL was never intended to replace the Lebanese state. On the contrary, its mandate assumes that the Lebanese state and its armed forces should progressively exercise authority over their own territory. [1]

At the same time, questioning whether the LAF can “replace” UNIFIL should not become an argument against the capabilities of the Lebanese Army. Over the years, the LAF has shown considerable potential despite operating under difficult political, economic and security conditions. One of the clearest examples was the 2017 Fajr al-Joroud operation against ISIS militants positioned along Lebanon’s northeastern border. The Army used ground maneuvers, artillery and air capabilities to drive ISIS fighters from Lebanese territory. Having had experience on the battlefield heavily reinforces the image of the LAF as a force capable of defending its territory while not completely modernized. The U.S. Department of State described the campaign as the LAF’s largest and most successful military operation in more than a decade, while also describing Lebanese ground forces in 2017 as one of the region’s most effective counterterrorism partners. [2, 3]

These developments are particularly relevant to the LAF’s ability to assume greater responsibility in southern Lebanon. Its experiences in border security, intelligence, joint operations, and territorial control provides an operational foundation for expanding state authority in the South, as envisaged under Resolution 1701. (footnote 3: United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1701 (2006), S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006), paras. 8, 11–12.) The LAF’s longstanding deployment and coordination with UNIFIL further demonstrates its familiarity with the security environment of the region. (footnote 4: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), “UNIFIL Operations,” accessed September 3, 2026.) While the LAF continues to face resource and capacity constraints, these experiences suggest that it possesses capabilities that could support a broader role in the South if adequately reinforced.

The United Nations itself has recognized this performance. In a report on the implementation of Resolution 1701, the UN Secretary-General commended the Lebanese Armed Forces both for contributing to calm along the Blue Line and for its counterterrorism operations, describing the Army as essential to extending state authority, defending Lebanese sovereignty and protecting national security. This is important because it changes the basis of the debate. The issue is not that the Lebanese Army is incapable of assuming greater responsibility in the South. In fact, strengthening the LAF and expanding its deployment in southern Lebanon are essential to the extension of effective state authority and the exercise of Lebanese sovereignty over its territory. [4]

However, military capability does not automatically make the LAF a substitute for UNIFIL because the two institutions serve different purposes. UNIFIL has a function that cannot simply be reproduced by increasing the number of Lebanese soldiers in the South. Lebanon and Israel do not maintain normal diplomatic relations, and UNIFIL has historically provided a channel through which both sides can communicate on security matters. Its Tripartite mechanism brings together representatives of UNIFIL, the LAF and the Israeli military to address Blue Line violations, operational issues and potential sources of escalation. UNIFIL describes the Tripartite forum as the only forum where Lebanese and Israeli representatives meet at any level, while its liaison branch maintains communication with both sides to prevent misunderstandings and de-escalate incidents. [5]

This is where the role of the LAF differs from that of UNIFIL. The Lebanese Army represents the Lebanese state. Its role is to defend the country, protect its territory and enforce state authority; it is not designed to act as a neutral diplomatic buffer between Lebanon and Israel. UNIFIL’s usefulness comes precisely from its international status and its ability to engage both parties. Therefore, even if the LAF becomes capable of assuming most security responsibilities currently supported by UNIFIL, there remains a separate question concerning who will carry out monitoring, liaison and de-escalation after the peacekeeping force leaves.

This distinction has become increasingly important following Security Council Resolution 2790 (2025), adopted on 28 August 2025. The resolution extended UNIFIL’s mandate for a final time until 31 December 2026, after which an orderly and safe drawdown and withdrawal is to begin and be completed within one year. At the same time, it called on the Lebanese authorities to extend the Government’s control over all Lebanese territory and stated that UNIFIL’s withdrawal should proceed with the aim of making the Lebanese Government the sole provider of security in southern Lebanon. This supports the argument that the future security of the South should increasingly rest with the LAF. It also shows that UNIFIL was never supposed to become a permanent substitute for Lebanese sovereignty. [6]

To conclude, the Lebanese Army has shown over the years that it possesses significant potential and can assume greater responsibility for security in South Lebanon. Its counterterrorism record, border operations, professional development and resilience under difficult conditions all support a larger role for the LAF. Yet, this does not mean that it can simply “replace” UNIFIL. The obstacle is not merely military capability; it is the difference in objective. The LAF exists to defend Lebanese sovereignty, while UNIFIL provides an international mechanism for monitoring, communication and de-escalation. Therefore, the post-UNIFIL debate should not be reduced to replacing foreign soldiers with Lebanese soldiers. The real challenge is to transfer territorial security to the Lebanese state while determining what credible mechanism, if any, will perform the diplomatic and monitoring functions that UNIFIL leaves behind.

references:

[1]United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1701 (2006), S/RES/1701, 11 August 2006, paras. 11–12.
[2] U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2017: Lebanon, describing the 2017 LAF campaign and Lebanon’s counterterrorism role.
[3] Lebanese Armed Forces, “The Crossroads of Crisis: Terrorism, Refugees, and Public Policy in Lebanon,” discussing Operation Fajr al-Joroud (2017).
[4] United Nations Secretary-General, “Secretary-General’s Remarks at Ministerial Meeting of the International Support Group for Lebanon,” Rome, 15 March 2018.
[5] UNIFIL, “UNIFIL Engagement with the Parties,” Press Kit, section on the Tripartite Forum and Liaison Branch.
[6] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2790 (2025), S/RES/2790, 28 August 2025, paras. 1, 4–5.

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