An Age of Political Separation: The Right to Asylum in an Era of Border Externalization

Executive Summary:

The swift rise of the adoption of border externalization policies has cost migrants an unbearable humanitarian burden. Approximately 5,000 refugees have been forcibly detained in Oceania alone since Australia adopted its offshore processing policies in 2012 (Offshore Processing Statistics, 2026). The adoption of border externalization deals in the Mediterranean, such as the infamous EU-Turkey Agreement has caused 35,000 migrants to go missing since 2014 due to limited access to safer routes (Missing Migrants Project, 2026). A number of wealthy nations that have adopted these policies, such as Australia, the EU and the USA have signed the 1951 Refugee Convention (Refugee Convention, 1951). Therefore, they have declared legal compliance regarding the rights of refugees. Yet, they systematically prevent asylum seekers from reaching their borders in order to access their rights. This is only possible because three main dimensions protect wealthy nations which have adopted border externalization policies. The Issue Synopsis and Insight and Analysis sections focus first on the failure of the 1951 Refugee Convention’s address on territory, which does not address prevention of entry. For this reason, states are able to implement policies to drive away refugees from reaching their borders and claiming asylum rights. Second, accompanying policies addressing “safe” third-party countries allows these nations to create deals and pay off countries to take in migrants, which gives the illusion that migration is being dealt with properly. Finally, the lack of enforcement by a body within International Law produces conflicting opinions on border externalization between regions, with nations being allowed to choose which rulings apply to them. These three dimensions can only be addressed together, as they overlap to create a shield for wealthy nations to continue the practice of border externalization policies. This report suggests that the adjustment and clarification of the legality of non-refoulement policies, a burden-sharing framework for refugee-linked nations, and international oversight of these border externalization systems can be utilized to protect the rights of refugees seeking asylum. The issue of border externalization is a critical challenge that can no longer be ignored, as the abuse of a system intended to protect vulnerable individuals has caused a humanitarian crisis and a crucial denial of justice internationally for those who need it most.

Issue Synopsis:

Introduction:

According to the core treaties and declarations of International Law, such as The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “seeking asylum is an inherent human right and every person in the world has the right to apply for asylum” (“Asylum and Refugee Status”, 2026). Despite this inherent human right, wealthy nations continue to prevent migrants from seeking asylum on their shores, and resort to methods to outsource these migrants to poorer nations (Clark, 2002). This is continuously upheld due to the occurrence of passed bills enforcing stricter border control, and the maintenance of legal compliance by border control agencies and, as of recently, citizens of these wealthy nations. In this article, the issue of border externalization will be examined from three different angles: the recently enforced and emerging legal architecture that allows for border externalization, the human cost, and why the enforcement of international law, especially the rights of asylum seekers, is failing.

Problem Analysis Framework:

1. Border externalization takes advantage of the legal obscurities found in many international law and human rights treaties and declarations that dictate the rights of asylum seekers, such as the 1951 Refugee Convention.

   1. The language within the 1951 Refugee Convention was used in a time in which asylum claims were being made at the borders of countries or within countries by asylum seekers, and is not adapted to the modern dilemma of hindering asylum seekers from doing so completely.

i. According to Article 31 of the 1951 Refugees Convention, “The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened” (Refugee Convention, 1951). Article 31 assumes that the asylum seeker is entering or has already entered the contracting state. Rich nations argue that this article is void given that the asylum seekers are being subjected to border externalization before they enter said nation.

ii. According to Article 33 of the 1951 Refugees Convention, “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened” (Refugee Convention, 1951). This article, again, assumes that the asylum seeker is entering or has already entered the territory of the contracting state as per the term “refouler” which means “to turn away”. Additionally, the word territory is used vaguely in the convention, and does not specify whether this territory is strictly physical land, or includes maritime borders as well.

iii. According to the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, the timing in which a refugee is truly considered a refugee is vague, as “recognition of his refugee status does not therefore make him a refugee but declares him to be one” (UNHCR Handbook, 2019). Therefore, wealthy nations are able to use this vague wording to utilize border externalization, as a refugee may not have been considered a refugee in the first place if he does not meet the criteria.

2. The vast majority of treaties within International Human Rights Law include the absolute prohibition on torture, which includes non-refoulement. However, implementing courts typically dissent when states prevent asylum seekers from entering rather than turning them away.

i. According to the case of M.N. and Others v. Belgium, in which a couple of Syrian Nationality and their children applied for a visa to Belgium through the Belgian Embassy in Lebanon with the purpose of seeking asylum, “a jurisdictional link” was ruled to be missing by the Belgian Court (Branko, 2023). The applicants were denied entry into Belgium due to the absence of Belgian jurisdiction, resulting in border externalization within a third country.

ii.In the case of Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, in which “the United States Coast Guard intercepted vessels illegally transporting passengers from Haiti…without first determining whether they qualify as refugees” (Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 1993), the US Supreme Court ruled that “The refugees attempting to escape from Haiti did not claim a right of admission into the country” (Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 1993). Therefore, the US Supreme Court ruled that this case exhibited non-refoulment, and did not fit the categories of the prohibition of torture stated in International Human Rights Law.

iii. According to the policy of the High Court of Justice in the United Kingdom, border externalization may occur if the nation that the asylum seekers hail from is deemed “a safe third country” (Pijnenburg and Van Der Pas, 2025). In the case of Rwanda, and upon the election of a popular government in the United Kingdom between 2022 and 2024, legislation was passed in order to “enable the transfer of asylum-seekers from the United Kingdom to Rwanda” (Pijnenburg and Van Der Pas, 2025) with no international legal repercussions for both nations.

2.  The practice of border externalization by wealthy nations does not solve the problem of migration. Rather, it allows wealthy nations to evade the responsibility of protecting potential asylum seekers, increasing humanitarian costs around the world.

   1.  Around the world, migration rates and associated death rates of migrants are increasing drastically due to border externalization being practiced by wealthy nations.

i. According to the United Nations International Organization for Migration, “at least 990 (migrant) deaths have been recorded in 2026” from trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea to reach bordering European countries to seek asylum (AFP and AP, 2026). This is mainly due to the lack of safe pathways to these countries, which is an indirect practice of border externalization.

ii.The practice of Offshore Processing in Australia, which includes “rescuing or intercepting asylum seekers at sea, bringing them to Australia, and then forcibly transferring them” to offshore facilities in nearby islands (Gleeson and Yacoub, 2024). After the Offshore Processing policy was implemented in Australia in 2013, more migration boats arrived off of Australian shores, and deaths of migrants sharply rose compared to earlier data from 2009 due to the change of policy (Gleeson and Yacoub, 2024).

iii. Due to the rise of popular governments, and the consequent increase of border externalization methods, the industry of migrant smuggling has expanded due to the lack of legal routes (Smuggling of Migrants, 2026). According to global figures collected by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, criminals that take advantage of large numbers of migrants and smuggle them across dangerous routes due to this lack of legal routes and fears of border externalization, make around 7 billion US Dollars a year in profit (Smuggling of Migrants, 2026). This has simultaneously led to higher death rates among migrants.

2. The practice of border externalization by wealthy nations has resulted in a disproportionate number of migrants fleeing to nations that are bordering conflict zones, resulting in an indirect de-facto protection system.

i.According to the 2024 Data Set published by the United Nations, low- and middle- income countries have housed a significantly larger number of migrants and refugees fleeing conflict than high income countries (Refugee Data Finder, 2024). The countries with the highest percentage of refugees in 2024 include Colombia, Turkey, and the Islamic Republic of Iran (Refugee Data Finder, 2024). Countries such as the United States and Germany receive a high percentage of asylum-seeking claims, but their refugee populations are significantly low (Global Trends Forced Displacement, 2019).

ii. Lebanon, which has the “highest per capita number of refugees in the world”, has also had “one of the worst socio-economic crises of the 21st Century” (Diab, 2023). In addition, according to the European Commission, “80 percent of Lebanese live in poverty”, “90 percent of Syrian refugees in Lebanon cannot cover their basic needs”, and “93 percent of Palestinian refugee households are poor” (Diab, 2023). Despite these disparities, there has been no international accountability or burden-sharing by wealthy countries in neighboring regions.

iii. The European Union has been able to strike deals with other countries in order to host migrants in their nations instead of in EU member nations. A primary example of this is the EU’s deal with Turkey, in which a 6 billion Euro budget was given to refugees in Turkey by the EU to keep them housed in Turkey rather than allowing them to claim asylum in Europe (EU Signs Final Contracts, 2020).

3. Though International Law demands for the protection of the rights of migrants and asylum seekers, enforcement mechanisms to ensure this protection are fragmented and insufficient.

   1. International courts have not been able to reach definitive conclusions regarding border externalization and the rights of migrants, allowing nations to select favorable interpretations when processing trials.

i. In the case of N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, the European Court of Human rights found Spain responsible for practicing border externalization by collectively expelling migrants over its border in Melilla (EIN, 2017). However, the European Court of Human Rights was clear to make an exception for “en masse” crossings if the asylum seekers did not attempt to use a legal method to claim asylum beforehand (EIN, 2017). These methods, as seen in the first and second thematic claims, are dwindling and do not guarantee that migrants will be able to claim asylum.

ii. In the case of Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber ruled that migrants who were placed in externalized buffer zones does not equate to unlawful detention in accordance with Article 5 of the European Court of Human Rights (Ramos, 2021). This created a loophole, and allowed the Hungarian Government to justify using buffer zones, a form of border externalization, by stating that the state had been “coping with the mass influx of migrants” (Ramos, 2021). This ruling was found to be in direct conflict with the UNHCR ruling “in which transit zones were considered to amount to detention camps”, and allowed for Hungary to follow the ruling of the ECHR rather than the UNHCR (Ramos, 2021).

iii. Evidence 3: Despite the United Nations possessing a convention on the protection of refugees and migrants (The 1951 Refugee Convention), and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) declaring its jurisdiction within this convention, the International Court of Justice has not issued any general judgements or advisory opinions on refugees, migrants and asylum seekers (Skordas, 2018). This has allowed for exceptions to be made, as seen in the above cases, by domestic courts who may form their own clauses regarding the rights of migrants.

2.  The 1951 Refugee Convention lacks basic enforcements, including a dedicated court, and therefore cannot utilize resolution mechanisms in cases regarding the rights of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers.

i. As mentioned in the above sub claim, the International Court of Justice claims jurisdiction over the implementation of the 1951 Refugee Convention. However, a lack of a specialized and enforced court is more dire in the case of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Issues of non-refoulement “should be interpreted in the view of the principles of burden-sharing and solidarity” (Skordas, 2018). Therefore, the lack of a specialized court to address these principles specifically, or at least an advisory opinion from the ICJ, leaves the dilemma of non-refoulement in a legal void.

ii. Despite the declaration of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the 1951 Refugee Convention, the framework of the ICJ prevents it from effectively enforcing its jurisdiction in border externalization cases. According to the ICJ’s website, “The Court can only hear a dispute when requested to do so by one or more States. It cannot deal with a dispute on its own initiative” (Frequently Asked Questions, 2026). Therefore, unless a state willingly allows a dispute to be heard regarding their border externalization policies, then the jurisdiction of the ICJ is not applicable. This allows for the evasion of justice for the victims of border externalization and accountability on behalf of the nations that practice it.

iii.The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the guardian body of the 1952 Refugee Convention, is largely regarded as a humanitarian organization rather than a legal body of the United Nations (UNHCR Lebanon, 2026). Therefore, the UNHCR cannot act legally to enforce the convention, as it is not a legal body itself, and lacks the elements to be considered a legal body. These include an investigative court and a separate enforcement body that may send a fact-finding committee to investigate infringements of the convention.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, the lack of specificity within international law, the refusal to practice shared responsibility, and the absence of specialized enforcement mechanisms reveals that the issue of border externalization lies in a legal and political gray zone. These three thematic claims demonstrate that border externalization is not a random process that triggers spontaneous consequences. Instead, it is a covered-up systematic process because international law permits it, nations defend it, and enforcement is absent. Therefore, key questions need to be asked in order to tackle this complex topic. Why is border externalization increasing despite the heavy cost to maintain it? Why do international and domestic courts still permit and, in some cases, legalize the practice of border externalization? To answer these questions regarding the continued persistence of border externalization, the legal, political and institutionalized forces that make this policy attractive, despite increasing evidence of humanitarian harm, must be investigated.

Insight & Analysis:

Introduction:

The practice of border externalization by countries worldwide has been documented heavily by a number of sources (Madi, 2026). It is becoming more widespread of a practice with the election of populist governments, and according to the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, border externalization poses “significant risks of human rights violations” (Madi, 2026). However, despite international pressure and criticism regarding the practice, and the increase of evidence on border externalization’s many risks, states continue to enforce these policies. This indicates that border externalization and its practice is far more than just a political policy. Rather, it is a policy that is protected by weak institutional designs with underlying incentives to maintain it.

There are three main dimensions of causation that act as a backbone for the continuation of border externalization. First, the presence of specific historical context makes the legality of border externalization ambiguous, allowing states to use extraterritorial methods that remain uncertain in the domain of law. Second, there are political incentives with monetary gain that make border externalization an attractive policy for both primary and third-party “safe” countries. This mutual gain minimizes domestic pressure from involved parties, and simultaneously pushes the humanitarian risk of border externalization under the rug. Third, the weak enforcement foundation within International Law indicates that countries cannot be forced to repeal any of these policies due to the lack of reversal mechanisms. These dimensions combined create a self-reinforcing system for states practicing border externalization, as they can sustainably evade any associated consequences.

The Legal Design and the Jurisdiction Void: Why Does International Law Permit the Prevention of Entry?

The key convention highlighting the rights of refugees, migrants and asylum seekers, the 1951 Refugee Convention, was created within a post-World War 2 setting. At the time, Europe observed a huge influx of refugees due to the effects of World War 2 (What is the 1951 Refugee Convention, 2025). Therefore, the aim of the convention was to define what a refugee was, and to highlight the legal obligations towards these refugees (What is the 1951 Refugee Convention, 2025). With these obligations came a cardinal principle known as “non-refoulement” or “no return” (What is the 1951 Refugee Convention, 2025). According to Article 33, “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened” (The 1951 Refugee Convention, 1951). This principle specifically addressed not returning refugees or any person at risk, and this clause assumes that these persons at risk entered the country in the first place due to the historical context of war refugees entering bordering countries within the EU. Though many wealthy nations signed and ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, it left a legal gap regarding border externalization as it gained popularity with emerging popular governments in recent years (Pushing Back Protection, 2021).

As time evolved, this created ambiguity regarding the rights of refugees, migrants and asylum seekers, especially regarding Article 33. Border externalization is able to withstand legal pursuit because Article 33 assumes that the persons at risk have entered the country, as this wording was appropriate in its original historical context. It rendered the possibility of asylum seekers from formally claiming asylum in the first place impossible because they were deterred from entering the nation in question. A significant example of the results of this ambiguity is Australia’s evolving border externalization policy. Upon the election of a new government in September 2013, a policy named “Operation Sovereign Borders” was launched in Australia (Gleeson & Yacoub, 2025). In Operation Sovereign Borders, maritime border security was tightened by the Australian military, and its primary enforcement mechanism was to “intercept and turn back boats” and send migrants to offshore processing units in order “to prevent asylum seekers travelling by boat from obtaining protection in Australia” (Gleeson & Yacoub, 2025). Due to Article 33’s historical context, this policy is legal under International Law since asylum seekers were and still are being intercepted before they reach Australia. Therefore, because this method deters asylum seekers from using their protections highlighted in Article 33, it has created a legal void, and International Courts are unable to try Australia or the emerging Australian Governments for implementing this policy.

The Politics Behind Deterrence: Why do Governments Implement Border Externalization Policies Despite the Risks to Human Life?

Border externalization is not drafted and implemented randomly by governments looking to secure their nation’s borders. Additionally, it is important to recognize that Border Externalization is a modern policy, and therefore, it is a modern problem caused by the present political climate worldwide. In a recent survey which analyzed the attitudes regarding immigration practices by citizens in wealthy European countries, around half agreed that migrants should not only be denied entry to their country of residence, but also be “required to leave” (Smith, 2025). This political attitude is quite recent, and is the result of emerging right-wing populist governments, who have “added a second antagonism of us versus them (migrants and immigrants)” (Greven, 2016). In order to embody this sentiment, modern right-wing populist parties have shifted wealthy nations to adopt stricter policies regarding immigration, such as the Brexit movement in the United Kingdom, and the Trump Administration in the United States, both of which promised to put a stop to this “antagonism” (Joppke, 2020). By introducing border externalization as a political strategy, these governments display themselves as heroes who have stopped the influx of people who cannot assimilate into their nation’s monoculture in order to appeal to future voters and maintain electoral viability. This concept is known as valence voting, and it is defined as “voters deciding based on their evaluations of the competence of parties” (Stiers, 2022). In other words, voters vote on which party is able to deliver the results that they have promised them. By implementing policies such as Border Externalization, right-wing populist governments are able to maintain the image that they are delivering tighter security to their citizens. Paired with the increasing political sentiment as described by the previous poll, this allows governments to maintain integrity and increases their chances of getting elected for future terms.
Modern governments that have adopted the right-wing populist are signatories of many treaties in International Law, including the 1951 Refugee Convention (State Parties, 2015). Therefore, they cannot directly violate any articles mentioned in the convention and in other treaties they have signed within International Law, as it would make them internationally liable for their policies, and would result in harsh criticism from their citizens and the international community. Border externalization acts as a work around for these governments despite the humanitarian cost that accompanies it. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, there is no treaty or convention in International Law which directly condemns Border Externalization. Therefore, Border Externalization allows governments to keep their international image while retaining these restrictive policies for their benefit.

In addition, Border Externalization creates dependencies on these wealthy countries. For example, Australia’s formal agreement with Nauru dictates that they must pay Nauru up to 2.5 billion dollars for the duration of the 30-year agreement (McDonnell, 2026). Though this agreement has never been released to the public, and Nauru has faced questions regarding its status as a Safe Third World Country, Australia has reassured the public that their “compliance with the Refugee Convention is important to both Australia and Nauru as signatories” (McDonnell, 2026).

Therefore, not only does Border Externalization allow for wealthy nations to maintain their international image, but it renders other countries dependent on the policy for extra income in exchange for processing of these refugees. Abolishing border externalization would indicate that these wealthy nations have made a humanitarian mistake, and this would lose the electoral investment they have relied on to keep them in power. This would be too politically expensive for either side to bear. As a result, Border Externalization persists despite the humanitarian toll attached to it.

The Enforcement Vacuum: Why do States Continue to Practice Border Externalization despite International Calls to Action?

The enforcement structure of International Law has always been fundamentally weaker than that of domestic law and the courts of nations. When comparing both at a broad scale, domestic law uses direct methods of force, such as police enforcing arrests on those who are suspected of committing a crime. In addition, states also have direct sentencing by their courts, in which perpetrators are forced to comply with the punishment attributed to them. On the other hand, International Law operates through political and economic pressure as its primary tactic of enforcement, making them indirect mechanisms (Uphold International Law, n.d.). These indirect mechanisms are most effective at solving economic issues such as trade disputes between nations (Uphold International Law, n.d.). Furthermore, though many international courts exist today, the sentencing and rulings of these courts depend on voluntary state compliance with no direct compliance (UN Explained, 2025). Since International Law does not have a direct enforcement mechanism, that primarily indicates that International Law is more difficult to be monitored and upheld by international bodies than domestic bodies.

This weakness in enforcement is more apparent when we focus on the relationship between immigration and International Law. International Law is present internationally in many different courts and organizations. This fragments International Law into regions, such as Europe having a different ruling body of International Law (the European Court of Human Rights) than Africa (the African Commission). Though these regional approaches are innovative and multicultural, they also “pose a real threat to the coherence and integrity of International Law” by not being united under one ruling body (Zouapet, 2021). This leaves the issue of immigration fragmented between different ruling bodies, making it easy for nations to accept one ruling and reject another. Consequently, this makes enforcement even weaker than it originally would be if all nations accepted the rulings of one international court.

Additionally, there is no specific enforcement body dedicated to the rights of immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees in International Law. The UN Human Rights Committee may present their findings in a case, but it is not legally binding to a state, and cannot force a state’s compliance to its rulings, making enforcement non-existent (King & Pousadela, 2025). Even indirect enforcement attempts through different bodies are weak. For example, UN Special Rapporteurs, who may investigate an immigration case and report their findings, are also not legally binding (Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, 2025). Therefore, states may choose to completely ignore the report issued by the rapporteurs (Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, 2025). This case repeats itself with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), which is also not legally binding, as its role is to facilitate rather than to act as an international court (About UNHCR, 2026). Therefore, unlike other international bodies who have their own specialized mechanism or links to the UN Security Council, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, none of the bodies addressing immigration have a strong enforcement mechanism (Hibbs, 2017). It is because of this enforcement vacuum that states may pick and choose their policies without worrying about being pursued by any force.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, all three of the dimensions discussed reinforce each other to allow states to incorporate border externalization into their immigration policies. The legal ambiguity of border externalization gives states a technical defense against International Law. Political incentives offering monetary gain pushes states to pursue and exploit this ambiguity. Weak enforcement mechanisms in International Law means that states do not face the necessary consequences to stop these incentives. All together, these dimensions equate to sustainable evasion despite the significant humanitarian risks. Consequently, when thinking of solutions to the use of this policy, addressing each one alone will not work. Addressing the legal ambiguity alone will only push states to find new legal loopholes. Political incentives cannot be addressed without an enforcement mechanism, and enforcement mechanisms cannot be created alone without sealing legal loopholes. Therefore, all proposed solutions should address all three of these dimensions at once. The below section on policy recommendations will propose concrete mechanisms which will target all three dimensions mentioned within the body of this section.

Policy Recommendations:

The first policy recommendation in addressing border externalization would be to establish a mandatory international oversight body within the United Nations for externalized asylum systems. Existing bodies should play a key role in this body’s establishment, such as the UNHCR and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in order to advise and lead the implementation of this complementary body. This oversight body would have the authority to conduct inspections of offshore processing centers, monitor detention facilities holding asylum seekers, and review maritime interdiction operations. Much like the UN Special Rapporteurs, this body would issue findings on human rights compliance. However, these findings must be binding, and non-compliance of remediation orders by this body would trigger the forwarding of the case to the United Nations Security Council or the United Nations General Assembly. Since this would occur within the context of the UN, the body would apply globally to any state participating in border externalization policies. This body would take an estimated time of 18 to 24 months to be established, as it requires negotiation, treaty drafting, and staffing in order to fulfill all essential roles. Initial inspections would occur approximately 3 years after this system has been set up, and the most logical set-up would entail a phase system. For example, within the first 3 years, voluntary participation would be adopted to give time for the establishment to build a firm foundation. After these 3 years, when inspections begin, the focus would shift to mandatory participation in order to fill the enforcement gap. This body would allow documented conditions to become public, and would increase political pressure for reformation of these policies, as well as transparency regarding human rights abuses. This recommendation would not completely eliminate externalization, as enforcement of International Law is still quite rare, but it would make border externalization more costly for governments to maintain due to the increased exposure. However, states may refuse to participate or may physically obstruct inspections, and would require the accompaniment of political pressure to maintain moderate enforcement.

The second policy recommendation would be for the United Nations General Assembly to draft an interpretive resolution clarifying extraterritorial applications of non-refoulement. If drafted and passed, it can seal the legal gap the historical context has established on past treaties and conventions addressing immigration. This resolution would establish non-refoulement obligations which would apply whenever the state exercises effective control over any person outside of their borders. This would include maritime interdiction, border interception, funding third countries to intercept/detain, and offshore processing zones. Consequently, this resolution would need to include a clarified definition of jurisdiction, specific guidance on maritime operations and third-country complicity, and examples of what actions violate non-refoulement in the context of border externalization. By being passed through the UN General Assembly, this would eliminate the risk of veto power, and would provide an authoritative interpretation for future court cases and state practices. The UNHCR can also play an advisory role by assisting the drafting of the resolution and providing legal expertise throughout the process. Implementing this resolution would take multiple years, as implementation can occur within 2 years, but domestic and international courts may take additional time to adopt an interpretation of this resolution. Since this is a resolution being passed by the UN General Assembly, it would apply uniformly to all member states, and would be an added resolution to the Refugee Convention. This resolution would serve as the base of tackling border externalization, and would eliminate the legal ambiguity that defends border externalization. States would no longer be able to cite legal uncertainty in order to justify any prevention-of-entry tactic used on asylum seekers. However, the passing of this resolution is most likely to face resistance from major practicing states, and implementation may be uneven domestically in an attempt to protect these practices. That is why this resolution cannot function without the enforcement tactic suggested in the previous policy recommendation or alternative incentives, as explained in the policy recommendation below.

The third policy recommendation would be to introduce a binding international burden-sharing framework with specific goals such as resettlement targets and a refugee assistance fund. Establishing this framework would be complementary to the previous policy recommendation, and would primarily focus on the resettlement of refugees. In this framework, each developed nation would commit to resettling a minimum percentage of the global refugee population based on a specific capacity, such as GDP or existing refugee populations. Additionally, an international refugee assistance fund would ensure that developed nations contribute a measured sum based on their GDP. This fund would provide for refugees in developing nations that host refugees in order to support their education, healthcare, and local integration with their host country. However, this framework cannot work without an incentive. Nations who reach these resettlement targets would receive trade benefits, diplomatic recognition, and multilateral support priority. Nations who fail to meet these resettlement targets would face consequences, such as reduced support for their initiatives in multilateral forums. Contributing to the assistance fund would be mandatory, and failure to contribute would trigger discussions of sanctions between other member nations. The UN General Assembly would receive an annual report revolving around this framework from the UNHCR, which would act as the framework’s governing body. Additionally, the World Bank would assist in the administration of the assistance fund. The primary responsibility would fall on wealthy nations who have border externalization processes or who are already hosting a number of refugees in their territories. Much like the other policy recommendations, it would take many years to ensure full implementation. Multiple important phases would need to occur, such as a phase for negotiation between nations, a phase for implementation, and a phase for proper introduction of the resettlement and funding targets. This would require approximately 6 to 7 years in total. A similar framework, The Global Compact on Refugees, introduced the same values, but was non-binding on UN member states (The Global Compact on Refugees, 2018). Therefore, this implementation mechanism could be added to the already existing compact, as the compact already introduced a framework that was agreed upon in the New York Declaration (The Global Compact on Refugees, 2018). The framework would allow the negotiation and implementation phase to be decreased, as the enforcement clauses detailing refugee resettlement and the assistance fund would be the only sections that would need to be added to the framework. If the amendments were accepted and implemented by wealthy nations, it would reduce pressure on third party countries, and reduce the incentive for border externalization policies. However, the amendments would not fix border externalization immediately, and would take time to implement based on the cooperation of wealthy nations. In order for wealthy nations to comply, it would require significant political pressure and domestic opposition, which can only be achieved if all 3 policy recommendations are combined together. The implementation of the legal aspect in the 2nd policy recommendation would make this recommendation a necessary and attractive alternative, while the 1st policy recommendation would assist in making externalization less attractive with strict oversight from the international community. Therefore, all 3 policy recommendations set the stage for compliance, and would mutually reinforce each other if implemented side by side with the assistance of advocacy, media coverage of humanitarian risks, and support from progressive government parties to create needed domestic pressure for nations to act internationally.

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