The Deconfessionalization of a Confessional System: Lebanon’s Unfinished Debate

As we all know, a country once named “The Switzerland of the Middle East” has been, for decades, crumbling under the unbearable weight of political and economic collapse. However, many, especially among the youth, aren’t fully aware of the root cause. This article seeks to break down what some rightfully argue is at the heart of a country's failure: confessionalism.

It is essential to point out the ambiguities, contradictions, and unenforced laws that lie at the core of our political system. Then, we can start discussing confessionalism from different viewpoints before presenting possible reforms.

What is confessionalism and what triggered such practice? 

Let’s not beat around the bush, Lebanon’s biggest problem has been without a doubt confessionalism. In simple words, it implies an institutional political power-sharing system based on religion. The issue? This practice, deeply anchored in Lebanese politics, doesn’t have a constitutional basis. It comes from the National Pact (1943), originally destined for mutual recognition between Muslims and Christians. According to this pact, Christians in Lebanon would no longer seek western protection, while Muslims on the other hand would recognize Lebanon’s distinct identity from the surrounding Arab world and its Christian community’s special role. However, this pact had a secondary goal, a very controversial one. The parties agreed on a fixed distribution of key government posts. The President would go on to be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shia Muslim.

However, this contradicts a very important article in the Lebanese Constitution. Article 7 ensures that “All Lebanese shall be equal before the law. They shall equally enjoy civil and political rights and shall equally be bound by public obligations and duties without any distinction”. Pursuant to this article, the National Pact, which fixes a religion-based distribution of the most impactful government posts to 3 out of 18 confessions, can be considered unconstitutional and discriminatory towards the 15 other confessions.

Over the past few years one thing has become clear : the National Pact Solution, in charge of attributing key government posts based on confessions, hasn’t worked. This sparked tensions because naturally, some sects occupy more impactful roles than others. For instance, Muslim Shias don’t directly occupy key posts in the executive sector , as the president is a Maronite and the Prime Minister a Sunni muslim. Therefore, Shias have sought to occupy posts that could grant them more influence within the executive sector , acting as a “veto power” on important matters[2]. This is why Shias request having a Shia appointed as Minister of Finance as most decrees (coming from the two executive figures stated above) require an approval from the Minister of Finance. That’s just one example, but this is how Lebanese day-to-day politics work. Such a system turned out to be very prone to deadlocks, tensions and conflicts that drag basic matters on for months.

What are possible improvements to the current system regarding confessionalism?

When looking to innovate, two paths present themselves: enhance old ideas or find new ones. In this paragraph, we will focus on the former before exploring the latter a bit further.

The first idea is the one implemented today, a religion-based distribution of government posts divided among 3 out of the 18 confessions in Lebanon. A way of enhancing representation would be to alternate government posts between all of these confessions. This would not only align with the spirit of the 7th Article of the Lebanese Constitution , but would equally be synonymous with social justice as all confessions would have equal access to political power. However, it goes without saying that it needs to be planned carefully as alternating between 18 confessions is no easy task.

First, should a complete deconfessionalisation be considered?

A complete deconfessionalisation wouldn’t work out in a country like Lebanon where clientelism and religious sectarianism outweigh national unity.

In fact, people would vote for candidates sharing the same confessional affiliation seeking protection and assurance. This is due to a long-lasting lack of trust and a fear of being dominated by other sects. Moreover, a non-confessional system can be dangerous as the demographically dominant sect is likely to rule the country, unlike in a confessional system where power is shared among sects.

What are new possible solutions regarding confessionalism?

The deconfessionalisation process is one of the many positive aspects proposed by the Taif Agreement (1989). Except, these positive measures were never concretely put in place. Some rightfully argue that confessionalism can be necessary to maintain peace. In a country like Lebanon where sectarian affiliation outweighs national unity, the idea of being run by one sect - the demographically dominant one - can very well trigger tensions or even a civil war. However, when putting in place a confessional system, you’re already confessing to a weakness: the inability of running a country capable of overseeing sects without being run by them. Another weakness is the lack of transparency from people who are stuck in old practices such as clientelism, where politicians provide private benefits to people sharing the same confessional affiliation, in return for their electoral support . What’s the solution? Confessional system? Non-confessional system? What kind of system would suit a country like Lebanon where 18 confessions coexist? In the legal field, nuance is key. What Lebanon needs isn’t a purely confessional system, nor a purely non-confessional system. What is needed is a hybrid system ; one that can operate to satisfy all Lebanese citizens, but “one that can control sects and not be run by them. Then, we can start calling Lebanon a sovereign country” at least internally, rightfully argues the current PM Nawaf Salam.

A possible step-by-step reform that would help, slowly but surely, break down confessionalism where it should be:

To start, what we need is non-sectarian political parties. To put it simply, what political parties are built around can very well determine a country’s fate. Nowadays, in France, the US, and the UK, political parties are built around a clear set of principles, ideologies, and programs without being linked in any way to confessional affiliation . This is the direction these countries are heading in. Today, Lebanon’s political parties are driven by religious interests, and this is the direction our country is heading in. Therefore, we should pass laws requiring any political party that wants to sit in Parliament to present a clear program based on defined ideologies. This will also help break down confessionalism as well as sectarian clientelism, as people adhering to any given party will act according to their programs. But passing such a law is not enough. An independent team of experts should be tasked with verifying whether these programs are actually being followed in practice, preventing these parties from going back to old habits.

The Lebanese Parliament should pass a law severely incriminating any kind of confessional clientelism in the context of presidential, legislative or municipal elections.

Then, Lebanon could draw lessons from an interesting aspect of Singapore’s model where a committee of transparent experts evaluates the background, competence, as well as the past record of any given presidential candidate. This ensures that qualified individuals reach the presidency. This vetting process shouldn’t be limited to the presidency. It should also apply to any potential Prime Minister or Speaker of Parliament ensuring that all three pivotal government posts are led by individuals chosen for their competence, not religion.

Once these measures are taken, we can cut all ties with a religion-based distribution of key government posts.

With that being said, where should confessionalism be maintained?

A confessional dimension should only be allowed in the Lebanese political system where it can solve potential conflicts of interests that could arise between different confessions. As contradictory as it seems, this could be explained by exploring a very important unenforced article of the current constitution.

The crucially unenforced 22nd Article of the Lebanese Constitution is often overlooked today. The article ensures that “With the election of the first Chamber of Deputies on a national, non-confessional basis, a Senate shall be established in which all the religious communities shall be represented. Its authority shall be limited to major national issues.” According to this article, on one hand, a Chamber of Deputies shall be formed on a national non-confessional basis. On the other hand, a Senate shall be formed in which all religious communities shall be represented. In fact, it smartly deals with the multitude of confessions that coexist in Lebanon today. However, the Senate has never been established because it required a specific law passed by the Parliament organizing its composition and powers. Due to sectarian tensions regarding these criteria, no compromise was reached on the allocation of seats. That’s why today, a unicameral parliament in Lebanon is established even though the Constitution provides for a bicameral one.

Consequently by shedding light on the main benefits of having a bicameral parliament, it becomes clear how the latter could serve Lebanon by partially maintaining confessionalism in the political system.

` Creating a bicameral Parliament is often a good idea for two main reasons. The first one is to avoid what we call a gouvernement d’assemblée in French; it essentially means a situation in which one chamber has the upper hand, often in a unicameral parliament or sometimes even in a bicameral parliament where power turns out to be unevenly distributed. This is exactly what forced France to go from a 4th to the 5th republic, creating a new constitution with a parliament possessing far less important prerogatives. What happened was that the lower chamber of the French parliament needed a simple majority in favor of the government’s dismissal. When seized by a vote of confidence, MPs used to coordinate beforehand to ensure that a simple majority was not reached, keeping the government in place, but weak, given that the lower chamber used to block the government’s policies, projects, and legislative agenda. This practice is called calibrage de vote, which ensured that a weak and stuck government would stay in place, while the lower chamber would go on to rule on a national level. In this case, a one-way control uncovered a crucial loophole in the 4th republic that unintentionally gave too much power to the lower chamber. When power is unevenly distributed and one side uses it unfaithfully, that’s what we call in the legal field “abuse of power”. This is why Montesquieu, a French political philosopher, famously claimed "Pour qu'on ne puisse abuser du pouvoir, il faut que, par la disposition des choses, le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir". This translates to “To prevent abuse of power, things must be arranged so that power checks power” (Esprit des Lois). It’s human nature : when power is unevenly distributed, abuse of power is almost inevitably due. Therefore, having a bicameral Parliament can always ensure a checks and balances system within the legislative branch, preventing any abuse of power. This is to say that having a unicameral Parliament today in Lebanon is far from ideal because history has shown that having a bicameral Parliament is the better option. It’s the path chosen by the USA, France and even by the United Kingdom. Although the Lebanese constitution envisions a bicameral parliament, the Senate has never been established to this day.

The second and important reason is that having a Senate, in addition to a lower chamber that deals with the lawmaking process on a national basis, has proven to be a great compromise to internal disputes. This was very well the case of the USA. In the late 1700s, a conflict emerged over the system of representation to be used in parliament. Larger states with larger populations wanted a proportional representation, granting them a majority over smaller states. Smaller states however, logically asked for equal representation. Therefore, The Great Compromise was reached on July 16 1787, creating a bicameral legislature with a House of Representatives relying on proportional representation and a Senate based on equal representation (two senators per state). However, this exact solution can’t be adopted in Lebanon as proportional representation in the Chamber of Deputies would give the majority to some sects, and a Senate relying on equal representation of sects wouldn’t accurately reflect the Lebanese population. A Senate can serve as a remedy to any internal issues that arise, as well as balancing interests within a divided society,- as demonstrated by the Great Compromise in a different context- and this is exactly what Lebanon needs.

Therefore, the application of the pivotal 22nd article of the current Lebanese Constitution could do wonders despite the delicate modalities of its application.The Senate’s election system is a delicate matter because equal representation (such as in the US) wouldn’t reflect the population accurately. However, a strictly proportional representation would likely grant an absolute majority to one sect : the Shias. A compromise must be reached in order to respect the democratic nature of the system. Starting with a Senate with a total of 54 seats doesn’t seem like a lot, but helps reach consensus faster thanks to shorter debates and sessions. It also serves as a better representation of minorities, preventing an overwhelming majority of seats being given to bigger sects.

One interesting solution would be giving an equal baseline to all sects, 2 seats per sect, bringing a baseline total of 36 seats. This ensures that minorities are not overlooked. Then, the 18 other seats shall be distributed proportionally, with a cap of 40% of total seats by sect, ensuring no absolute majority is secured by any sect, encouraging the formation of coalitions and alliances. This would help bring together sects further, politically as well as socially. Another possible election system revolves around a French-inspired one. In France, the Senate relies on a hybrid system : a proportional as well as a majoritarian system. Smaller departments electing 1 or 2 senators operate through a majoritarian system (two rounds if needed) while bigger departments electing 3 or more Senators function under a proportional system. However, a logical addition to the French system would consist in attributing 2 seats per sect, to ensure minorities are represented in the Senate.

Having discussed its representation modalities, we will demonstrate many scenarios where a Senate could be very useful.

A Senate could come in handy on a number of occasions. For instance, the lower chamber of the parliament, relying on non-confessional representation, could be debating a law that is likely to trigger a conflict of interest between sects. That’s where this bill could be sent over to the Senate, which, thanks to a proportional representation, could reach a compromise based on alliances given that no confession possesses an absolute majority. To imagine it more concretely, it could act as a “court” where representatives of different sects argue, debate, and reach compromises over legislative matters that trigger conflicts of interest. This can not only be applied to legislative matters, but even include executive matters. For example, the Senate could have a final say, alongside the Chamber of Deputies, reunited as a Congress, on declaring war, after the President’s initiative. Furthermore, as set out in the 63rd article of the Constitution, the President can dissolve the Chamber of Deputies only after consultation with the PM and the Speaker of Parliament. However, such power should be granted to an institution “closer” to the people : the Senate, as it proportionally represents the Lebanese people. Therefore, it could vote, after the President’s initiative, to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, to a 2/3 majority. This would serve as a check and balances system on the President, who can no longer arbitrarily dissolve the Parliament simply upon consultation of the PM as well as the Head of Parliament. The Senate would also serve as an instrument of control within the legislative sector by having the power to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies. However, as we said, power needs to check power in order to avoid any abuse of power. Therefore, the Senate has to be checked too, and should be dissolved in the same way as the Chamber of Deputies : upon an initiative of the President after a consultation with the PM and the Speaker of Parliament, and a vote to a 2/3 majority by the Chamber of Deputies.

Having proposed numerous reforms, it’s worth asking : who will take the initiative to present and implement these reforms? In his book Le Liban d’Hier à Demain, the current PM Nawaf Salam asserts that: “The plain and simple truth is that the deconfessionalization of the Lebanese political system cannot be introduced by political forces that are themselves confessional and compete over their respective shares within this very confessional system. (...) It is up to civil society to take up the challenge of deconfessionalization. Its array of professional organizations, business associations, workers’ unions, student unions, and other similar groups with interests that know no confessional barriers provides concrete examples of what non-confessional institutions could be and how they might be managed. Finally, the hope of freeing oneself from the grip of this confessional system was revived by the transcendence of communal, regional, and partisan allegiances, demonstrated particularly by the youth in their solidarity throughout the uprising that began in October 2019.”

To conclude, as demonstrated throughout this article, nuance is key. Neither a purely confessional nor a fully non-confessional system would serve Lebanon. What is needed is the deconfessionalisation of key government posts while preserving a limited form of confessional representation. Paradoxically, what has long been Lebanon’s biggest burden can very well provide part of the remedy to its problems.

References

[1] (Lebanese National Pact | History, Significance, & Facts, 2025)

[2] (“Lebanese National Pact | History, Significance, & Facts”)

[3] (Salam, Nawaf. Le Liban d’Hier à Demain, Sindbad, Mai 2021)